The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jiao, Zhenhua; Tian, Guoqiang
• 署名单位: Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.015
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 44-55
• 关键词: many-to-many matching; Blocking Lemma; Max-min preferences; deferred acceptance algorithm; strategy-proofness

摘要

This paper considers the incentive compatibility in many-to-many two-sided matching problems. We first show that the Blocking Lemma holds for many-to-many matchings under the extended max-min preference criterion and quota-saturability condition. This result extends the Blocking Lemma for one-to-one matching and for many-to-one matching to many-to-many matching problem. It is then shown that the deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for agents on the proposing side under the extended max-min preference criterion and quota-saturability condition. Neither the Blocking Lemma nor the incentive compatibility can be guaranteed if the preference condition is weaker than Keywords: the extended max-min criterion. (c) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.