Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Duggan, John
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.013
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 111-126
• 关键词: Bargaining; coalition formation; Equilibrium existence; dynamic games

摘要

This paper addresses the question of existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in a class of dynamic games that includes many known bargaining models and models of coalition formation. General sufficient conditions for existence of equilibria are currently lacking in a number of interesting environments, e.g., models with non-convexities, consumption lower bounds, or an evolving state variable. The main result establishes existence of equilibrium under compactness and continuity conditions, without the structure of convexity or strict comprehensiveness used in the extant literature. The proof requires a precise selection of voting equilibria following different proposals using a generalization of Fatou's lemma. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.