Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham; University of Rochester; University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.010
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 30-40
• 关键词: Bargaining; endogenous status quo; Markov perfect equilibrium; Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution

摘要

This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probability, a set of alternatives corresponds to the absorbing points of an equilibrium if and only if it is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. We also apply our analysis of ergodic properties of equilibria to the persistent agenda setter environment of Diermeier and Fong (2012). We show that all equilibria are essentially pure, and we extend their characterization of absorbing sets to allow an arbitrary voting rule and by removing the restriction to pure strategy equilibria. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.