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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Kamada, Yuichiro
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Many models of learning in games implicitly or explicitly assume there are many agents in the role of each player. In principle this allows different agents in the same player role to have different beliefs and play differently, and this is known to occur in laboratory experiments. To explore the impact of this heterogeneity, along with the idea that subjects use their information about other players' payoffs, we define rationalizable partition confirmed equilibrium (RPCE). We provide several ...
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作者：Hwang, Ilwoo
作者单位：University of Miami
摘要：I study a dynamic one-sided-offer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under incomplete information. The seller knows the quality of his product, while the buyer does not. During bargaining, the seller may receive an outside option, the value of which depends on the quality of the product. If the outside option is sufficiently important, there is an equilibrium in which the buyer's belief about the product's quality stays constant and she continues to make the same randomized offer th...
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作者：Smith, Vernon L.; Wilson, Bart J.
作者单位：Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：An exceptionally robust result in experimental economics is the failure to observe equilibrium (subgame perfect) play in the ultimatum game. A heretofore unnoticed feature of the game is that neither player voluntarily chooses to play. Motivated by Adam Smith's proposition that beneficence like that of non-equilibrium play in the ultimatum game cannot be extorted by force, we offer the responder the opportunity to opt out of the game for a mere $1 payoff for both players. We observe far higher...
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作者：Mauleon, Ana; Roehl, Nils; Vannetelbosch, Vincent
作者单位：University Saint-Louis - Bruxelles; University of Paderborn
摘要：We develop a general theoretical framework that allows us to study the group structures that are going to emerge at equilibrium in overlapping coalition settings. We introduce the notion of constitution in order to model for each group the rules governing both the composition of the group and the conditions needed to leave the group and/or to become a new member of the group. We propose the concept of constitutional stability to study the group structures that are going to emerge at equilibriu...
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作者：Leucci, Stefano; Mamageishvili, Akaki; Penna, Paolo
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：This work gives the first natural non-utilitarian problems for which the trivial n approximation via VCG mechanisms is the best possible. That is, no truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate, where n is the number of agents. The problems we study are the min-max variant of the shortest path and the (directed) minimum spanning tree mechanism design problems. In these procurement auctions, agents own the edges of a network, and the corresponding edge costs are private. Instead of the ...
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作者：Macho-Stadler, Ines; Perez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We propose the average approach, where the worth of a coalition is a weighted average of its worth for different partitions of the players' set, as a unifying method to extend values for characteristic function form games. Our method allows us to extend the equal division value, the equal surplus value, the consensus value, the lambda-egalitarian Shapley value, and the family of least-square values. For each of the first three extensions, we also provide an axiomatic characterization of a part...
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作者：Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：This paper presents a new solution concept for multiplayer stochastic games, namely, acceptable strategy profiles. For each player i and state s in a stochastic game, let w(i)(s) be a real number. A strategy profile is w-acceptable, where w = (w(i)(s)), if the discounted payoff to each player i at every initial state s is at least w(i)(s), provided the discount factor of the players is sufficiently close to 1. Our goal is to provide simple strategy profiles that are w-acceptable for payoff vec...
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作者：Lombardi, M.; Yoshihara, N.
作者单位：University of Glasgow; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst; Hitotsubashi University; Kochi University Technology
摘要：This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen's (2012) Theorem 1 to weaker notions of truth-telling. It models individual i's honesty standard as a profile of (possibly non-empty) collections of ordered pairs of outcomes, one for each member of society, over which individual i feels truth-telling concerns. Individual i is honest provided that she states her true preferences as well as rankings (not necessarily complete) of outcomes that are consistent with the true preferences of ind...
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作者：Lubensky, Dmitry; Schmidbauer, Eric
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida
摘要：In a veto game a biased expert recommends an action that an uninformed decision maker can accept or reject for an outside option. The arrangement is ubiquitous in political institutions, corporations, and consumer markets but has seen limited use in applications due to a poor understanding of the equilibrium set and an ensuing debate over selection. We develop a simple method to construct every veto equilibrium and identify the most informative equilibrium in a setting that spans prior work. W...
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作者：Derks, Jean
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We consider transferable utility games, where restricted cooperation is modeled by a fixed mapping assigning to each coalition the set of players that are controlled by this coalition. We study the Shapley value on the resulting class of restricted games, and provide axiomatic frameworks characterizing this value. Studies show that several classes of so-called conjunctive restrictions lead to frameworks similar to the original introduced by Shapley in 1953. We show that conjunctivity of the re...
