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作者：Bonanno, Giacomo; Tsakas, Elias
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; Maastricht University
摘要：We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Borgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom wher...
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作者：Grant, Simon; Kline, J. Jude; Quiggin, John
作者单位：Australian National University; University of Queensland
摘要：We introduce linguistic ambiguity into a principal-agent contracting framework. Contracts are drafted in a common language. Nevertheless, the principal and the agent may ultimately disagree about the terms of the contract that apply ex post. We presume that both parties are ambiguity averse and for tractability reasons that their preferences take a recursive constant absolute risk averse (RCARA) form. We consider various dispute resolution regimes and analyze how the optimal dispute resolution...
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作者：Hellman, Ziv; Schreiber, Amnon
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：We characterise two new orders of desirability of gambles (risky assets) that are natural extensions of the stochastic dominance order to complete orders, based on choosing optimal proportions of gambles. These orders are represented by indices, which we term the S index and the G index, that are characterised axiomatically and by wealth and utility uniform dominance concepts. The S index can be viewed as a generalised Sharpe ratio, and the G index can be used for maximising the growth path of...
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy
摘要：The paper shows that Shapley's axiomatic characterization of his value can be strengthened considerably. Indeed, his additivity axiom can be replaced by a simple accounting property whereby a player's payoff is the difference of a reward based on the worth of coalitions to which she belongs, and a tax based on the worth of coalition to which she does not belong, without placing any restriction whatsoever on the functional relationship between the reward or the tax and the worths that determine...
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作者：Haimanko, Ori
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：I introduce a new axiom for power indices on the domain of finite simple games that requires the total power of any given pair i. j of players in any given game v to be equivalent to some individual power, i.e., equal to the power of some single player k in some game w. I show that the Banzhaf power index is uniquely characterized by this new equivalence to individual power axiom in conjunction with the standard semivalue axioms: transfer (which is the version of additivity adapted for simple ...
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作者：Skibski, Oskar; Michalak, Tomasz R.; Wooldridge, Michael
作者单位：University of Warsaw; University of Oxford
摘要：A long debated but still open question in the game theory literature is that of how to extend the Shapley Value to coalitional games with externalities. While previous work predominantly focused on developing alternative axiomatizations, in this article we propose a novel approach which centers around the coalition formation process and the underlying probability distribution from which a suitable axiomatization naturally follows. Specifically, we view coalition formation in games with externa...
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作者：Aguiar, Victor H.; Pongou, Roland; Tondji, Jean-Baptiste
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Ottawa; University of Texas System; University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
摘要：The unique properties of the Shapley value-efficiency, equal treatment of identical input factors, and marginality-have made it an appealing solution concept in various classes of problems. It is however recognized that the pay schemes utilized in many real-life situations generally depart from this value. We propose a non-parametric approach to testing the empirical content of this concept with limited datasets. We introduce the Shapley distance, which, for a fixed monotone transferable-utili...
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作者：Boncinelli, Leonardo; Pin, Paolo
作者单位：University of Florence; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We provide a perturbed evolutionary model of matching on a graph. First, we obtain that maximal matchings are the singleton recurrent classes of the model without perturbations. Then, we apply stochastic stability analysis considering two different error models: the link-error model, where mistakes directly hit links, and the agent-error model, where mistakes hit agents' decisions, and indirectly links. We find that stochastic stability is ineffective for refinement purposes in the link-error ...
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作者：Karos, Dominik; Peters, Hans
作者单位：Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：We axiomatically develop a class of power indices for effectivity functions, both for the case where the set of alternatives is finite and where it is infinite. Such power indices make it possible to take the issues under consideration into account, in contrast to power indices defined just for simple games. As an example, we consider the US legislative system. We also show that our approach can be used to develop power indices for spatial political games. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights res...
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作者：Mu'alem, Ahuva; Schapira, Michael
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：This paper presents inapproximability results for paradigmatic multi-dimensional truthful mechanism design problems. We first show a lower bound of 2 - 1/n for the scheduling problem with n unrelated machines (formulated as a mechanism design problem in the seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen on Algorithmic Mechanism Design). Our lower bound applies to universally-truthful randomized mechanisms, regardless of any computational assumptions on the running time of these mechanisms. Moreover, it hold...
