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作者：Dziewulski, Pawel
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Suppose a researcher observes a finite number of preference comparisons between pairs (x, t) of rewards x delivered at time t. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which such a dataset can be rationalised with the most common specifications of the discounted utility model. The distinctive feature of our characterisation is that it refers to notions of stochastic dominance among empirical distributions defined over the observed rewards and time delays. Crown Copyright (C) 2018 P...
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作者：Meir, Reshef; Kalai, Gil; Tennenholtz, Moshe
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：Richman games are zero-sum games, where in each turn players bid in order to determine who will play next (Lazarus et al., 1999). We extend the theory to impartial general-sum two player games called bidding games, showing the existence of pure subgame-perfect equilibria (PSPE). In particular, we show that PSPEs form a semilattice, with a unique and natural Bottom Equilibrium. Our main result shows that if only two actions available to the players in each node, then the Bottom Equilibrium has ...
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作者：Tobias, Aron
作者单位：Syracuse University
摘要：A monopolist produces a good for sale to a buyer with uncertain valuation. The seller seeks to implement a profit-maximizing non-linear pricing scheme, which includes the time at which the good is shipped to the consumer. If the buyer discounts future payoffs and the seller does not, then delayed shipments act as an almost-perfect substitute for complete information and the monopolist can extract almost all of the surplus from trade. Shipping policies thus serve as a powerful tool of enhancing...
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作者：Jang, Dooseok; Patel, Amrish; Dufwenberg, Martin
作者单位：Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); University of East Anglia; University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Institutions for co-financing agreements often exist to encourage public good investment. Can such frameworks deliver maximal investment when agents are motivated by reciprocity? We demonstrate that indeed they can, but not how one might expect. If maximal investment is impossible in the absence of the institution and public good returns are high, then an agreement signed by all parties cannot lead to full investment. However, if all parties reject the agreement, then full investment is attain...
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作者：Orhun, A. Yesim
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：In reciprocal interactions, both genuine kindness and self-interested material gain may motivate socially beneficial actions. The paper presents results from two experiments that distinguish the role of perceived motives in reciprocal decision making from the role of outcomes or perceived intentions. The results indicate that positive reciprocity triggered by the same beneficial action is lower when the first-mover is more likely to be motivated by strategic incentives. Therefore, stronger inc...
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作者：Chen, Wei-Cheng; Chen, Yi-Yi; Kao, Yi-Cheng
作者单位：National Chung Cheng University; Feng Chia University; Chung Yuan Christian University
摘要：This paper investigates a college admissions problem in which students' choice set is limited by colleges' strategic actions, such as early decision programs in the US or simultaneous entrance examinations in Asia, in order to prevent multiple applications. We call this action the conflicting strategy and conduct laboratory experiments to explore the problem. We argue that colleges' prestige and students' uncertainty about admissions outcomes are two important factors. Our model and experiment...
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作者：Ostroy, Joseph M.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Lloyd Shapley's contributions with respect to the core are interpreted as subdifferentiability characterizations of the pricing of individuals that is similar to the pricing of commodities in economic models of exchange with transferable utility. Differentiability of the core is interpreted as perfect substitutability with respect to the pricing of individuals. Differentiability implies, but is not implied by, equivalence of the core and Walrasian equilibria. Differentiability eliminates oppor...
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作者：Afacan, Mustafa Oguz
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：The existing priority-based object allocation literature restricts objects' priorities to be deterministic. However, agents might be probabilistically prioritized ex-ante, for instance, through a non-uniform tie-breaking rule. This paper generalizes the deterministic setting by allowing priorities to be random. In this probabilistic environment, we first introduce a fairness notion called claimwise stability in the spirit of the usual stability of Gale and Shapley (1962). We show that the natu...
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作者：Wu, Qingyun; Roth, Alvin E.
作者单位：Stanford University; Stanford University
摘要：In a many-to-one matching model, we show that the set of envy-free matchings is a lattice. A Tarski operator on this lattice, which can be interpreted as modeling vacancy chains, has the set of stable matchings as its fixed points. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Daskalova, Vessela
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：This paper presents an experiment investigating whether decision makers discriminate between members of their own group and members of another group. I focus on two aspects of this question: First, I compare behavior in individual and in joint decisions; Second, I test whether the identity of the co-decision maker matters in joint decisions. Substantial own group favoritism occurs in joint decisions in spite of there being no such favoritism in individual decisions. Decision makers strongly fa...
