Values for environments with externalities - The average approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Macho-Stadler, Ines; Perez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.003
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 49-64
• 关键词: externalities; sharing the surplus; Average approach

摘要

We propose the average approach, where the worth of a coalition is a weighted average of its worth for different partitions of the players' set, as a unifying method to extend values for characteristic function form games. Our method allows us to extend the equal division value, the equal surplus value, the consensus value, the lambda-egalitarian Shapley value, and the family of least-square values. For each of the first three extensions, we also provide an axiomatic characterization of a particular value for partition function form games. And for each of the last two extensions, we find a family of values that satisfy the properties. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.