Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Smith, Vernon L.; Wilson, Bart J.
• 署名单位: Chapman University System; Chapman University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.006
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 452-464
• 关键词: ultimatum games; Voluntary play; Adam Smith; Experimental economics

摘要

An exceptionally robust result in experimental economics is the failure to observe equilibrium (subgame perfect) play in the ultimatum game. A heretofore unnoticed feature of the game is that neither player voluntarily chooses to play. Motivated by Adam Smith's proposition that beneficence like that of non-equilibrium play in the ultimatum game cannot be extorted by force, we offer the responder the opportunity to opt out of the game for a mere $1 payoff for both players. We observe far higher rates of equilibrium play, including highly unequal splits, than heretofore reported in binary choice versions of the game. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.