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作者：Cooper, David J.; Ioannou, Christos A.; Qi, Shi
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of East Anglia; William & Mary
摘要：We examine the effects of endogenous assignment to incentive contracts on worker productivity. Assignment to high performance pay via a market mechanism is roughly twice as effective as imposing the same contract exogenously. This positive effect is largely offset by a negative effect for workers that endogenously choose low performance pay. We decompose the positive effect of endogenous assignment to high performance pay into effects due to selection and strategic anticipation, and find that ...
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作者：Friedman, Jane; Parker, Cameron
作者单位：University of San Diego
摘要：Ternary voting games (TVGs) model situations where a voter has three options, which can be thought of as yes, no, and abstention. This paper presents (phi) over tilde, an extension of the Shapley-Shubik power measure to ternary voting games. (phi) over tilde measures a voter's power as the probability that the voter will be pivotal given that they do not abstain. This contrasts with other extensions of the Shapley-Shubik measure to TVGs, which measure power as the probability that a player's v...
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作者：Grabisch, Michel; Sudholter, Peter
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; University of Southern Denmark; University of Southern Denmark
摘要：It is known that for supermodular TU-games, the vertices of the core are the marginal vectors, and this result remains true for games where the set of feasible coalitions is a distributive lattice. Such games are induced by a hierarchy (partial order) on players. We propose a larger class of vertices for games on distributive lattices, called min-max vertices, obtained by minimizing or maximizing in a given order the coordinates of a core element. We give a simple formula which does not need t...
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作者：Matros, Alexander
作者单位：University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia; Lancaster University
摘要：Anyone who has ever studied game theory knows the name Lloyd Shapley. Just recall Matching, Deferred-Acceptance Algorithm, Core, Market Games, Stochastic Games, Shapley value, and Shapley vector) But Professor Shapley was also a great lover of chess with imperfect information. Upon our first encounter at Stony Brook in 1998, I was fortunate to investigate the chess problems he set before me. In this essay I analyze some of those problems, in commemoration of Lloyd Shapley's contributions to th...
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作者：Ziliotto, Bruno
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：This paper proves several Tauberian theorems for general iterations of operators, and provides two applications to zero-sum stochastic games where the total payoff is a weighted sum of the stage payoffs. The first application is to provide conditions under which the existence of the asymptotic value implies the convergence of the values of the weighted game, as players get more and more patient. The second application concerns stochastic games with finite state space and action sets. This pape...
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作者：Galanis, Spyros
作者单位：University of Southampton
摘要：What are the implications on trading activity if investors are not sophisticated enough to understand and evaluate trades that have a complex payoff structure? Can frictions generated by this type of financial complexity be so severe that they lead to a complete market freeze, like that of the recent financial crisis? Starting from an allocation that is not Pareto optimal, we find that whether complexity impedes trade depends on how investors perceive risk and uncertainty. For smooth convex pr...
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作者：Hagenbach, Jeanne; Perez-Richet, Eduardo
作者单位：Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：We study a class of sender-receiver disclosure games in the lab. Our experiment relies on a graphical representation of sender's incentives in these games, and permits partial disclosure. We use local and global properties of the incentive graph to explain behavior and performance of players across different games. Sender types whose interests are aligned with those of the receiver fully disclose, while other types use vague messages. Receivers take the evidence disclosed by senders into accou...
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作者：Bichler, Martin; Paulsen, Per
作者单位：Technical University of Munich
摘要：Principal-agent relationships between the supervisory board and the management of firms are widespread in multi-object markets such as spectrum auctions. The management aims at winning the highest valued licenses whereas the board wants to maximize profit and limits exposure. If efficiency requires multiple firms to coordinate on winning smaller sets of objects, we demonstrate that principals would do so while agents would not and inflate demand to larger sets. We first show that even if the p...
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作者：Hsiaw, Alice
作者单位：Brandeis University
摘要：This paper studies the role of goal bracketing to attenuate time inconsistency. When setting non-binding goals for a multi-stage project, an agent must decide how to group, or bracket, such goals for evaluation. He can bracket broadly by setting an aggregate goal for the entire project, or narrowly by setting incremental goals for individual stages. A loss averse agent brackets optimally by trading off motivation and risk pooling, which interacts non-trivially with time discounting. An aggrega...
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作者：Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W.
作者单位：University of Bonn; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Cologne
摘要：In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments with verifiable effort. In our experiment, the players endogenously negotiate contracts. In line with contract theory, the contractibility of the outcome plays a crucial role when effort is a hidden action. If the outcome is contractible, most players overcome the hidden action problem by agreeing on incentive-compatible c...
