Acceptable strategy profiles in stochastic games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Solan, Eilon
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.011
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 523-540
• 关键词: Stochastic games; Acceptable strategy profiles; Automata

摘要

This paper presents a new solution concept for multiplayer stochastic games, namely, acceptable strategy profiles. For each player i and state s in a stochastic game, let w(i)(s) be a real number. A strategy profile is w-acceptable, where w = (w(i)(s)), if the discounted payoff to each player i at every initial state s is at least w(i)(s), provided the discount factor of the players is sufficiently close to 1. Our goal is to provide simple strategy profiles that are w-acceptable for payoff vectors w in which all coordinates are high. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.