The Shapley value of conjunctive-restricted games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Derks, Jean
• 署名单位: Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.012
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 146-151
• 关键词: Transferable utility games; Restricted cooperation; Shapley value; axiomatic approach; Conjunctive restriction

摘要

We consider transferable utility games, where restricted cooperation is modeled by a fixed mapping assigning to each coalition the set of players that are controlled by this coalition. We study the Shapley value on the resulting class of restricted games, and provide axiomatic frameworks characterizing this value. Studies show that several classes of so-called conjunctive restrictions lead to frameworks similar to the original introduced by Shapley in 1953. We show that conjunctivity of the restriction is not only sufficient but also necessary. (C) 2018 Published by Elsevier Inc.