-
作者：Perea, Andres
作者单位：Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：Battigalli (1997) has shown that in dynamic games with perfect information and without relevant ties, the forward induction concept of extensive-form rationalizability yields the backward induction outcome. In this paper we provide a new proof for this remarkable result, based on four steps. We first show that extensive-form rationalizability can be characterized by the iterated application of a special reduction operator, the strong belief reduction operator. We next prove that this operator ...
-
作者：Chatterji, Shurojit; Zeng, Huaxia
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study the standard voting model with randomization. A Random Social Choice Function (or RSCF) satisfies the tops-only property if the social lottery under each preference profile depends only on the peaks of voters' preferences. We identify a general condition on domains of preferences (the Interior Property and the Exterior Property) which ensures that every strategy-proof RSCF satisfying unanimity has the tops-only property. We show that our condition applies to important classes of votin...
-
作者：de Oliveira, Henrique
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This paper gives a simple proof of Blackwell's theorem on the ranking of information structures. The proof extends naturally to environments where information arrives over time (leading to the notion of adapted garbling) and environments where information is diffused among multiple players (leading to the notion of independent garbling). (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Eguia, Jon X.; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Morton, Rebecca; Nicolo, Antonio
作者单位：Michigan State University; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of Padua; University of Manchester
摘要：Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive, symmetric or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes no restrictions on beliefs: we select the action profile that is supported in equilibrium by the largest set of beliefs. We conduct an experiment to compare the predictive power of the existing and our novel selection c...
-
作者：Mishra, Debasis; Nath, Swaprava; Roy, Souvik
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：In private values quasi-linear environment, we consider problems where allocation decisions along multiple components have to be made. Every agent has additively separable valuation over the components. We show that every unanimous and dominant strategy implementable allocation rule in this problem is a component-wise weighted utilitarian rule, which assigns non-negative weight vectors to agents in each component and chooses an alternative in each component by maximizing the weighted sum of va...
-
作者：Casajus, Andre; Huettner, Frank
作者单位：HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management; European School of Management & Technology
摘要：We suggest foundations for the Shapley value and for the naive solution, which assigns to any player the difference between the worth of the grand coalition and its worth after this player left the game. To this end, we introduce the decomposition of solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility. A decomposer of a solution is another solution that splits the former into a direct part and an indirect part. While the direct part (the decomposer) measures a player's contribution in a ...
-
作者：Jagadeesan, Ravi
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：In finite two-sided matching markets, the Lone Wolf Theorem guarantees that the same set of agents remains unmatched in all stable outcomes. I show by example that this assertion is not true in infinite, discrete markets. However, despite the fact that the Lone Wolf Theorem is often used to derive strategy-proofness, the deferred acceptance mechanism remains (group) strategy-proof in many infinite markets. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Fujinaka, Yuji; Wakayama, Takuma
作者单位：Kansai University; Ryukoku University
摘要：We consider house (re)allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. We are concerned with the possibility that a pair of agents may gain by swapping their endowments before the operation of the chosen rule. A rule is called endowments swapping-proof if it is immune to this kind of manipulation. Our main result is that the top trading cycles rule is the only rule that satisfies individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and endowments-swapping-proofness. (C) 2018 Elsev...
-
作者：Chen, Yan; Jiang, Ming; Kesten, Onur; Robin, Stephane; Zhu, Min
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University; Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Carnegie Mellon University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Beijing Normal University
摘要：We compare the performance of the Boston Immediate Acceptance (IA) and Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanisms in a laboratory setting where we increase the number of participants per match. In our experiment, we first increase the number of students per match from 4 to 40; when we do so, participant truth-telling increases under DA but decreases under IA, leading to a decrease in efficiency under both mechanisms. Furthermore, we find that DA remains more stable than IA, regardless of...
-
作者：Agranov, Marina; Yariv, Leeat
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Princeton University
摘要：We study the extent to which communication can serve as a collusion device in one-shot first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions. In an array of laboratory experiments we vary the amount of interactions (communication and/or transfers without commitment) available to bidders. We find that communication alone leads to statistically significant but limited price drops. When, in addition, bidders can exchange transfers, revenues decline substantially, with over 70% of our experimental auctions ...
