A theory of bargaining deadlock

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hwang, Ilwoo
• 署名单位: University of Miami
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.002
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 501-522
• 关键词: Bargaining game; asymmetric information; Bargaining deadlock; delay; Coase conjecture

摘要

I study a dynamic one-sided-offer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under incomplete information. The seller knows the quality of his product, while the buyer does not. During bargaining, the seller may receive an outside option, the value of which depends on the quality of the product. If the outside option is sufficiently important, there is an equilibrium in which the buyer's belief about the product's quality stays constant and she continues to make the same randomized offer throughout the bargaining process. As a result, the equilibrium behavior produces an outcome path that resembles a bargaining deadlock and its resolution. The equilibrium outcome exhibits bargaining delay that does not vanish even with frequent offers, and the limiting delay may exist even without a static adverse selection problem. Under stronger parametric assumptions, the equilibrium with deadlock is the only one in which behavior is monotonic in the buyer's belief. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.