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作者：Aziz, Haris; Brandl, Florian; Brandt, Felix; Brill, Markus
作者单位：Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO); CSIRO Data61; University of New South Wales Sydney; Technical University of Munich; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：We study social decision schemes (SDSs), i.e., functions that map a collection of individual preferences over alternatives to a lottery over the alternatives. Depending on how preferences over alternatives are extended to preferences over lotteries, there are varying degrees of efficiency and strategyproofness. In this paper, we consider four such preference extensions: stochastic dominance (SD), a strengthening of SD based on pairwise comparisons (PC), a weakening of SD called bilinear domina...
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作者：Clark, Derek J.; Nilssen, Tore
作者单位：UiT The Arctic University of Tromso; University of Oslo
摘要：We investigate a model of a series of contests in which a contestant's past and present success gives a head start over a rival in the future. How this advantage from winning affects contestants' efforts, whether the laggard gives up or keeps on fighting, and how the head start develops over time, are key issues. We find that the expected effort of the laggard will always be higher than the rival at some stage in the series of contests, and this is most likely to happen when at a large disadva...
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作者：Ghosal, Sayantan; Tonin, Simone
作者单位：University of Glasgow; Durham University
摘要：In this paper, we extend the noncooperative analysis of multilateral oligopoly to exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and trader types where exchange is modelled using a strategic market game with commodity money and trading posts. We prove the existence of an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium and its convergence to a Walras equilibrium when the economy is replicated. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kukushkin, Nikolai S.
作者单位：Federal Research Center Computer Science & Control of RAS; Russian Academy of Sciences; Dorodnitsyn Computing Centre, RAS; Moscow Institute of Physics & Technology
摘要：Strategic games are considered where each player's total utility is the sum of local utilities obtained from the use of certain facilities. All players using a facility obtain the same utility therefrom, which may depend on the identities of users and on their behavior. If a trimness condition is satisfied by every facility, then the game admits an exact potential; conversely, if a facility is not trim, adding it to a potential game may destroy that property. In both congestion games and games...
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作者：Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Piaser, Gwenael
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Rome Tor Vergata; IPAG Business School
摘要：We study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each type of each agent can participate with at most one principal and meaningfully communicate only with him. Exclusive competition is at the center stage of recent analyses of markets with private information. Economic models of exclusive competition restrict principals to use standard direct mechanisms, which induce truthful revelation of agents' exogenous pri...
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作者：Bilancini, Ennio; Boncinelli, Leonardo
作者单位：IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca; University of Florence
摘要：We show that separation in signaling games can be obtained without the single crossing condition, in a model where the receiver reasons analogically across a pair of states and can acquire costly information on the sender's type. Beyond ordinary separation (high type sends high signal, low type sends low signal) we find that also reverse separation is sustainable in equilibrium (high type sends low signal, low type sends high signal). Further, reverse separation in one state is obtained only i...
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作者：Chen, Xi; Diakonikolas, Ilias; Paparas, Dimitris; Sun, Xiaorui; Yannakakis, Mihalis
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Southern California; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We resolve the complexity of revenue-optimal deterministic auctions in the unit-demand single-buyer Bayesian setting, i.e., the optimal item pricing problem, when the buyer's values for the items are independent. We show that the problem of computing a revenue optimal pricing can be solved in polynomial time for distributions of support size 2, and its decision version is NP-complete for distributions of support size 3. We also show that the problem remains NP-complete for the case of identica...
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作者：Margaria, Chiara; Smolin, Alex
作者单位：Boston University; University of Bonn
摘要：We study dynamic games in which senders with state-independent payoffs communicate to a single receiver. Senders' private information evolves according to an aperiodic and irreducible Markov chain. We prove an analog of a folk theorem that any feasible and individually rational payoff can be approximated in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if players are sufficiently patient. In particular, there are equilibria in which the receiver makes perfectly informed decisions in almost every period, even...
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作者：Ushchev, Philip; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Monash University; University of Southampton; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
摘要：We develop a product-differentiated model where the product space is a network defined as a set of varieties (nodes) linked by their degrees of substitutability (edges). We also locate consumers into this network, so that the location of each consumer (node) corresponds to her ideal variety. We show that there exists a unique Bertrand-Nash equilibrium where prices are determined by both the firms' sign-alternating Bonacich centralities and the average willingness to pay across consumers. We al...
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作者：Amir, Rabah; Evstigneev, Igor V.
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Manchester
摘要：The paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the standard Bertrand duopoly with a homogeneous product. The main condition is elementary, easy to interpret, and nests all known sufficient conditions in the literature. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
