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作者：Rehbeck, John
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：This note studies whether any set of finitely supported mixed strategies can be represented as the unique Nash equilibrium of a game. This note shows that if strategy spaces are metric spaces containing infinitely many points, then any set of finitely supported mixed strategies can be represented as the unique Nash equilibrium to a separable game. If the strategy spaces are additionally subsets of Euclidean space with infinitely many cluster points, then any set of finitely supported mixed str...
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作者：Blume, Andreas
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：This paper explores higher-order uncertainty about message availability in communication games with perfectly aligned preferences. It can be impossible to achieve ex post efficiency in equilibrium even when it is mutual knowledge that the size of the set of available messages would be sufficient to convey all payoff-relevant information. There are equilibria that achieve ex post efficiency whenever a rich language condition is satisfied: the set of available messages is large relative to the s...
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作者：Celen, Bogachan; Ozgur, Onur
摘要：Final-offer arbitration (FOA) is a widely used binding dispute resolution mechanism, where an impartial arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the two final offers proposed by two disputing parties. We build an equilibrium model of FOA with players averse to arbitral uncertainty to study three important issues: the role of FOA in incentivizing negotiated settlements, the convergence of final offers, and the normative effect of diversity of arbitrator opinion. We show that increase in arbit...
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作者：Hu, Cheng-Cheng; Tsay, Min-Hung; Yeh, Chun-Hsien
作者单位：National Cheng Kung University; National Chung Cheng University; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：We investigate the nucleolus from both axiomatic and strategic perspectives in the nested cost-sharing problem in which the cost of a public facility has to be shared among agents having different needs for it. We adopt a Right-endpoint Subtraction (RS) formulation, which underlies these two properties: RS bilateral consistency and RS converse consistency. As we show, the nucleolus is the only RS bilaterally consistent (or RS conversely consistent) rule satisfying equal treatment of equals and...
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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Repeated communication in networks is often considered to impose large information requirements on individuals, and for that reason, the literature has resorted to use heuristics, such as DeGroot's, to compute how individuals update beliefs. In this paper we propose a new heuristic which we term the Bayesian Peer Influence (BPI) heuristic. The BPI accords with Bayesian updating for all (conditionally) independent information structures. More generally, the BPI can be used to analyze the effect...
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作者：Zhang, Huanren
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
摘要：I use an evolutionary game to investigate how the level of noise influences cooperation and efficiency in a dynamic setting. Players choose strategies to play indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas; the strategies are represented by finite automata, and complexity costs are imposed. Players update their strategies based on the successfulness of the strategies. Using both theoretical analysis and computational experiments, I show that the presence of noise dramatically changes the system dyn...
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作者：Ellis, Andrew
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：I consider static, incomplete information games where players may not be ambiguity neutral. Every player is one of a finite set of types, and each knows her own type but not that of the other players. Ex ante, players differ only in their taste for outcomes. If every player is dynamically consistent with respect to her own information structure and respects Consequentialism, then players act as if expected utility for uncertainty about types. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Feess, Eberhard; Kerzenmacher, Florian
作者单位：Victoria University Wellington; Frankfurt School Finance & Management
摘要：Recent experiments on lying behavior show that the lying frequency in case of low outcomes increases in the ex-ante probability of high outcomes. This finding is in line with models consisting of internal lying costs and external reputation costs and rejects certain other models, but does not allow for a clean test of models with reference dependent loss aversion. To compare the explanatory power of reputation models and loss aversion models, we manipulate the ex-ante probability that lying is...
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作者：Biro, Peter; Kern, Walter; Paulusma, Daniel; Wojuteczky, Peter
作者单位：HUN-REN; HUN-REN Centre for Economic & Regional Studies; Institute of Economics - HAS; Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Corvinus University Budapest; University of Twente; Durham University
摘要：We consider multiple partners matching games (G, b, w), where G is a graph with an integer vertex capacity function b and an edge weighting w. If G is bipartite, these games are called multiple partners assignment games. We give a polynomial-time algorithm that either finds that a given multiple partners matching game has no stable solution, or obtains a stable solution. We characterize the set of stable solutions of a multiple partners matching game in two different ways and show how this lea...
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作者：Rees-Jones, Alex
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Strategy-proof mechanisms eliminate the possibility for gain from strategic misrepresentation of preferences. If market participants respond optimally, these mechanisms permit the observation of true preferences and avoid the implicit punishment of market participants who do not try to game the system. Using new data from a flagship application of the matching literature the medical residency match-I study if these potential benefits are fully realized. I present evidence that some students pu...
