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作者：Dur, Umut; Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：North Carolina State University
摘要：Top Trading Cycles was originally developed as an elegant method for finding a competitive equilibrium of Shapley and Scarf's housing market. We extend the definition of a competitive equilibrium to the school assignment problem and show that there remains a profound relationship between Top Trading Cycles and a competitive equilibrium. Specifically, in every competitive equilibrium with weakly decreasing prices, the equilibrium assignment is unique and exactly corresponds to the Top Trading C...
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作者：Serrano, Roberto
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This paper provides an annotated bibliography of Lloyd Shapley's contributions to matching theory, game theory in general, and other areas in mathematics. 2017 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Sawa, Ryoji; Wu, Jiabin
作者单位：University of Tsukuba; University of Oregon
摘要：This paper investigates the role of loss-aversion in affecting the long-run equilibria of stochastic evolutionary dynamics. We consider a finite population of loss-averse agents who are repeatedly and randomly matched to play a symmetric two-player normal form game. When an agent revises her strategy, she compares the payoff from each strategy to a reference point. Under the resulting dynamics, called prospect dynamics, risk-dominance is no longer sufficient to guarantee stochastic stability i...
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作者：Balkenborg, Dieter
作者单位：University of Exeter
摘要：In a model of modal logic it is shown that the assumptions of rationality and intelligence of the players imply that only rationalizable strategies can be played. Nothing more can be inferred from these rules. Hereby the assumption of Intelligence expresses that whatever an outside observer can deduce about the play of the game can be inferred by the players themselves, provided they have the same information. In our framework the assumption of intelligence is simply the familiar inference rul...
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作者：Steg, Jan-Henrik
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：This paper provides a general characterization of subgame-perfect equilibria for strategic timing problems, where two firms have the (real) option to make an irreversible investment. Profit streams are uncertain and depend on the market structure. The analysis is based directly on the inherent economic structure of the model. In particular, determining equilibria with preemptive investment is reduced to solving a single class of constrained optimal stopping problems. Further tools are derived ...
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作者：Wenner, Lukas M.
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：I study experimental markets in which sellers interact with buyers who have biased beliefs about characteristics of the product sold. I examine whether such buyers can be exploited by sellers through the use of specifically designed pricing structures. Theoretically, I show that a necessary condition for exploitation is consumer naivet about their belief bias, otherwise they infer their biased beliefs from the sellers' actions. My main experimental result establishes that whether exploitation ...
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作者：Ambuehl, Sandro; Li, Shengwu
作者单位：University of Toronto; University Toronto Scarborough; University of Toronto; Harvard University
摘要：How do individuals value noisy information that guides economic decisions? In our laboratory experiment, we find that individuals underreact to increasing the informativeness of a signal, thus undervalue high-quality information, and that they disproportionately prefer information that may yield certainty. Both biases appear to be mainly due to non-standard belief updating. We find that individuals differ consistently in their responsiveness to information - the extent that their beliefs move ...
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作者：Dugar, Subhasish; Shahriar, Quazi
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; California State University System; San Diego State University
摘要：This paper is the first to compare the efficiency-enhancing capacity of two communication protocols in experimental stag-hunt games. The traditional restricted protocol that allows communicating intentions only fails to improve efficiency over the no-communication conditions. When players are allowed to send any messages (free-form), the majority of them send messages that underscore a reason for which players should choose the efficient action. To explore further whether the absence of such a...
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作者：Busetto, Francesca; Codognato, Giulio; Ghosal, Sayantan; Julien, Ludovic; Tonin, Simone
作者单位：University of Udine; University of Glasgow; Durham University
摘要：We show the existence of a Cournot Nash equilibrium for a mixed version of the Shapley window model, where large traders are represented as atoms and small traders are represented by an atomless part. Previous existence theorems for the Shapley window model, provided by Sahi and Yao (1989) in the case of economies with a finite number of traders and by Busetto et al. (2011) in the case of mixed exchange economies, are essentially based on the assumption that there are at least two atoms with s...
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作者：Lagziel, David; Lehrer, Ehud
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：An investor has some funds invested through portfolio managers. By the end of the year, she reallocates the funds among these managers according to the managers' performance. While the investor tries to maximize her subjective utility (that depends on the total expected earnings), each portfolio manager tries to maximize the overall amount of funds bestowed in his hands to manage. A reward scheme is a rule that determines how funds should be allocated among the managers based on their performa...
