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作者：Kawagoe, Toshiji; Matsubae, Taisuke; Takizawa, Hirokazu
作者单位：Future University Hakodate; Chuo University; Chuo University
摘要：This paper presents a theoretical and experimental study of affirmative action policies in school choice problems focusing on the minority reserve mechanism, or DA-Reserve, proposed by Hafalir et al. (2013) and the majority quota mechanism, or DA-Quota, proposed by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003), Kojima (2012) and Matsubae (2011). An evaluation of the performance of these mechanisms showed that, (1) while truth-telling is a dominant strategy in both mechanisms, the rate of its occurrence was...
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作者：Beal, Sylvain; Ferrieres, Sylvain; Remila, Eric; Solal, Philippe
作者单位：Universite Marie et Louis Pasteur; HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2
摘要：We study a non linear weighted Shapley value (Shapley. 1953b) for cooperative games with transferable utility, in which the weights are endogenously given by the players' stand-alone worths. We call it the proportional Shapley value since it distributes the Harsanyi dividend (Harsanyi, 1959) of all coalitions in proportion to the stand-alone worths of its members. We show that this value recommends appealing payoff distributions in several applications among which a land production economy int...
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作者：Dobzinski, Shahar; Mehta, Aranyak; Roughgarden, Tim; Sundararajan, Mukund
作者单位：Weizmann Institute of Science; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Stanford University; Stanford University
摘要：A general approach to the design of budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms is to use the Shapley value, applied to the given cost function, to define payments from the players to the mechanism. Is the corresponding Shapley value mechanism optimal in some sense? We consider the objective of minimizing worst-case inefficiency subject to a revenue constraint, and prove results in three different regimes. First, for the public excludable good problem, the Shapley value mechanism minimizes the wor...
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作者：Gensbittel, Fabien; Lovo, Stefano; Renault, Jerome; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：In zero-sum asynchronous revision games, players revise their actions only at exogenous random times. Players' revision times follow Poisson processes, independent across players. Payoffs are obtained only at the deadline by implementing the last prepared actions in the component game. We characterize the value of this game as the unique solution of an ordinary differential equation and show it is continuous in all parameters. As the duration of the game increases, the limit revision value doe...
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作者：Jagadeesan, Ravi; Kominers, Scott Duke; Rheingans-Yoo, Ross
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new Lone Wolf Theorem (Jagadeesan et al., 2017) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided strategy-proofness that is typically used in settings with discrete transfers. (C) 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Foster, Dean P.; Hart, Sergiu
作者单位：Amazon.com; University of Pennsylvania; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We propose to smooth out the calibration score, which measures how good a forecaster is, by combining nearby forecasts. While regular calibration can be guaranteed only by randomized forecasting procedures, we show that smooth calibration can be guaranteed by deterministic procedures. As a consequence, it does not matter if the forecasts are leaked, i.e., made known in advance: smooth calibration can nevertheless be guaranteed (while regular calibration cannot). Moreover, our procedure has fin...
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作者：Landeo, Claudia M.; Nikitin, Maxim
作者单位：University of Alberta; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：Financial constraints reduce the lawyer's ability to file lawsuits and bring cases to trial. As a result, access to justice for victims, pretrial bargaining, and potential injurers' precaution might be affected. We study civil litigation using a model that allows for asymmetric information, financially-constrained lawyers, third-party lawyer lending, and a continuum of plaintiffs types. We contribute to the economic analysis of law by generalizing seminal models of litigation (Bebchuk, 1984, 1...
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作者：Baucells, Manel; Samet, Dov
作者单位：University of Virginia; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider a group of individuals, such that each coalition of them is endowed with a preference relation, which may be incomplete, over a given set of prospects, and such that the extended Pareto rule holds. We assume that each singleton coalition has complete vNM preferences. In this setup, Baucells and Shapley (2008) gave a sufficient condition for a coalition to have complete preferences, in terms of the completeness of preferences of certain pairs of individuals. The new property that we...
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作者：Cao, Zhigang; Qin, Chengzhong; Yang, Xiaoguang
作者单位：Beijing Jiaotong University; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Chinese Academy of Sciences; Academy of Mathematics & System Sciences, CAS
摘要：Shapley (1955) introduced the model of an abstract market game as a generalization of the assignment game model, among several other models. He conjectured that abstract market games possess non-empty cores. We analyze properties of abstract market games and provide a proof of this conjecture for cases with four or fewer players. We show by example that, in general, the structure of an abstract market game is not strong enough to guarantee the nonemptiness of the core. We establish supplementa...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Frug, Alexander
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Aarhus University; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We propose a model of bilateral trade in which private information about the quality of an asset can be acquired only gradually over time. An asset is characterized by a vector of binary i.i.d. attributes, and its worth to a player is equal to a weighted sum of the attributes' values (where weights differ across players). The seller is initially uninformed about the attributes' values, and each period he decides whether to make a price offer or to costlessly inspect an attribute's value. The b...
