On random social choice functions with the tops-only property

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chatterji, Shurojit; Zeng, Huaxia
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.011
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 413-435
• 关键词: Random social choice functions; Unanimity; strategy-proofness; The tops-only property; The interior property; The exterior property

摘要

We study the standard voting model with randomization. A Random Social Choice Function (or RSCF) satisfies the tops-only property if the social lottery under each preference profile depends only on the peaks of voters' preferences. We identify a general condition on domains of preferences (the Interior Property and the Exterior Property) which ensures that every strategy-proof RSCF satisfying unanimity has the tops-only property. We show that our condition applies to important classes of voting domains which include restricted connected domains (Sato, 2013) and the multi-dimensional single-peaked domain (Barbera et al., 1993). As an application of our result, we show that every ex-post efficient and strategy-proof RSCF defined on the multi-dimensional single-peaked domain is a random dictatorship. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.