Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eguia, Jon X.; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Morton, Rebecca; Nicolo, Antonio
• 署名单位: Michigan State University; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of Padua; University of Manchester
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.008
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 465-483
• 关键词: Equilibrium selection; Passive beliefs; Symmetric beliefs; Vertical contracting; multiple equilibria; imperfect information

摘要

Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive, symmetric or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes no restrictions on beliefs: we select the action profile that is supported in equilibrium by the largest set of beliefs. We conduct an experiment to compare the predictive power of the existing and our novel selection criteria in an application on vertical multi-lateral contracting. We find that our criterion outperforms the other selection criteria. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.