Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jagadeesan, Ravi
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.015
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 275-286
• 关键词: Matching; large markets; Lone wolf theorem; strategy-proofness

摘要

In finite two-sided matching markets, the Lone Wolf Theorem guarantees that the same set of agents remains unmatched in all stable outcomes. I show by example that this assertion is not true in infinite, discrete markets. However, despite the fact that the Lone Wolf Theorem is often used to derive strategy-proofness, the deferred acceptance mechanism remains (group) strategy-proof in many infinite markets. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.