Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mishra, Debasis; Nath, Swaprava; Roy, Souvik
• 署名单位: Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.018
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 240-261
• 关键词: Separable types; Affine maximizer; Roberts' theorem

摘要

In private values quasi-linear environment, we consider problems where allocation decisions along multiple components have to be made. Every agent has additively separable valuation over the components. We show that every unanimous and dominant strategy implementable allocation rule in this problem is a component-wise weighted utilitarian rule, which assigns non-negative weight vectors to agents in each component and chooses an alternative in each component by maximizing the weighted sum of valuations in that component. A corollary of our result is that every unanimous and dominant strategy implementable allocation rule can be almost decomposed (modulo tie-breaking) into dominant strategy implementable allocation rules along each component. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.