Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fujinaka, Yuji; Wakayama, Takuma
• 署名单位: Kansai University; Ryukoku University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.004
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 187-202
• 关键词: Endowments-swapping-proofness; top trading cycles; strategy-proofness; Housing markets

摘要

We consider house (re)allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. We are concerned with the possibility that a pair of agents may gain by swapping their endowments before the operation of the chosen rule. A rule is called endowments swapping-proof if it is immune to this kind of manipulation. Our main result is that the top trading cycles rule is the only rule that satisfies individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and endowments-swapping-proofness. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.