Dominance rationality: A unified approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hillas, John; Samet, Dov
• 署名单位: University of Auckland; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.001
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 189-196
• 关键词: Dominance rationality; Strict dominance; Weak dominance; Order independence; Flaws; Common knowledge of rationality; iterative elimination

摘要

There are four types of dominance depending on whether domination is strict or weak and whether the dominating strategy is pure or mixed. Letting d vary over these four types of dominance, we say that a player is d-dominance rational when she does not play a strategy that is d-dominated relative to what she knows. For weak dominance by a mixed strategy, Stalnaker (1994) introduced a process of iterative maximal elimination of certain profiles that we call here flaws. We define here, analogously, d-flaws for each type of dominance d, and show that for each d, iterative elimination of d-flaws is order independent. We then show that the characterization of common knowledge of d-dominance rationality is the same for each d. A strategy profile can be played when d-dominance rationality is commonly known if and only if it survives an iterative elimination of d-flaws. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.