Weak belief and permissibility

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Catonini, Emiliano; De Vito, Nicodemo
• 署名单位: Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.007
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 154-179
• 关键词: Epistemic game theory; Permissibility; Dekel-Fudenberg procedure; Infinitely more likely; Lexicographic probability systems; Type structures; rationality

摘要

We provide epistemic foundations for permissibility (Brandenburger, 1992), a strategic-form solution concept for finite games which coincides with the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure, i.e., the elimination of all weakly dominated strategies, followed by the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We show that permissibility characterizes the behavioral implications of cautious rationality and common weak belief of cautious rationality in the canonical, universal type structure for lexicographic beliefs. For arbitrary type structures, we show that the behavioral implications of these epistemic assumptions are characterized by the solution concept of full weak best response set, a weak dominance analogue of best response set (Pearce, 1984). (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.