On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alston, Max
• 署名单位: Australian National University; Reserve Bank of Australia
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.008
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 336-344
• 关键词: Matching; game theory; STABILITY; nonexistence; incomplete information

摘要

This article extends the model of matching with incomplete information presented by Liu et al. (2014) by imposing exogenous restrictions on the beliefs of firms. The main result is that generically, there is always some game that contradicts the imposition of exogenous beliefs. This result complements Liu et al. (2014) by showing that their focus on stability for all reasonable beliefs is appropriate. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.