Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Feldman, Michal; Fu, Hu; Gravin, Nick; Lucier, Brendan
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; Microsoft
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.009
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 327-341
• 关键词: Auctions; Allocative efficiency; Cost-benefit analysis noncooperative games; Asymmetric and private information; mechanism design

摘要

A simultaneous item auction is a simple procedure for allocating multiple indivisible goods to a set of bidders. In a simultaneous auction, every bidder submits bids on all items simultaneously. The allocation and prices are then resolved for each item separately, based solely on the bids submitted on that item. Such procedures are similar to auctions used in practice (e.g. eBay) but are not incentive compatible. We study the efficiency of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) outcomes of simultaneous firstand second-price auctions when bidders have complement-free (a.k.a. subadditive) valuations. We show that the expected social welfare of any BNE is at least 12 of the optimal social welfare in the case of first-price auctions, and at least 14 in the case of second-price auctions. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc.