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作者：Sadler, Evan
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：I study learning about an innovation with costly information acquisition and knowledge sharing through a network. Agents situated in an arbitrary graph follow a myopic belief update rule. The network structure and initial beliefs jointly determine long-run adoption behavior. Networks that share information effectively converge on a consensus more quickly but are prone to errors. Consequently, dense or centralized networks have more volatile outcomes, and efforts to seed adoption should focus o...
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作者：Castillo, Geoffrey
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：The attraction effect violates choice consistency, one of the central assumptions of economics. I present a risky choice experiment to test it and disentangle some of its explanations. I find the attraction effect, but in a smaller magnitude than previously thought. I uncover a 'range effect' that shows that people weight more attributes whose range increases. I also show that the aggregate results hide considerable heterogeneity between subjects. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sun, Xiang; Zeng, Yishu
作者单位：Wuhan University; Wuhan University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper studies pure strategy perfect and proper equilibria for games with non-atomic measure spaces of players and infinitely many actions. A richness condition (nowhere equivalence) on the measure space of players is shown to be both necessary and sufficient for the existence of such equilibria. The limit admissibility of perfect and proper equilibria is also proved. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Danz, David
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This study investigates a source of comparative overconfidence, or overplacement, which occurs when people overestimate themselves relative to others. We present a simple application of information projection (Madarasz, 2012) to show that hindsight bias can lead to overplacement and excessive willingness to compete. We run an experiment in which subjects choose between a competitive tournament and piece-rate compensation after observing some of their competitors' past performance. We exogenous...
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作者：Sundararajan, Mukund; Yan, Qiqi
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：Most literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing for a risk-neutral seller. We consider risk-averse sellers in a setting of multi-unit auctions with unit-demand bidders. We seek utility-oblivious mechanisms that do not know about the seller's utility function, while still achieving constant factor approximations to the expected utility of the optimal mechanism tailored to the utility function. Our main results are natural hedging-based mechanisms that give such utility-oblivious appro...
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作者：Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele
作者单位：University of Turku; University of Glasgow
摘要：We study the relationship between the two-agent implementation problem and the concept of interim efficiency of Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) in Bayesian environments with private values and independent types. We present a general property, called closure under interim utility equivalence, and show it is sufficient for the implementation of social choice functions. This condition, when combined with another property, called interim inseparability, is also sufficient for the implementation of es...
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作者：Navarro, Noemi; Veszteg, Robert F.
作者单位：Universite de Bordeaux; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Waseda University
摘要：We report experimental results and test axiomatic models of unstructured bargaining by checking the empirical relevance of the underlying axioms. Our data support strong efficiency, symmetry, independence of irrelevant alternatives and monotonicity, and reject scale invariance. Individual rationality and midpoint domination are violated by a significant fraction of agreements that implement equal division in highly unequal circumstances. Two well-known bargaining solutions that satisfy the con...
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作者：Boosey, Luke; Goerg, Sebastian
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Technical University of Munich; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Max Planck Society
摘要：In a real-effort experiment, we investigate the relationship between reciprocity and the timing of discretionary bonuses in a two-period principal-agent (manager-worker) setting. We vary the timing of the manager's bonus decision in order to examine two main channels, reward and trust, through which discretionary bonuses may operate. Average worker performance improves when bonus decisions are made between the two periods, since both channels are simultaneously active. First-period output sign...
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作者：Bilo, Vittorio; Flammini, Michele; Moscardelli, Luca
作者单位：University of Salento; University of L'Aquila; Gran Sasso Science Institute (GSSI); G d'Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara
摘要：We consider broadcast network design games in undirected networks in which every player is a node wishing to receive communication from a distinguished source node sand the cost of each communication link is equally shared among the downstream receivers according to the Shapley value. We prove that the Price of Stability of such games is constant, thus closing a long-standing open problem raised in Anshelevich etal. (2008). Our result is obtained by means of homogenization, a new technique tha...
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作者：Aina, Chiara; Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Gamba, Astrid
作者单位：University of Zurich; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Insubria
摘要：In social dilemmas, choices may depend on belief-dependent motivations enhancing the credibility of promises or threats at odds with personal gain maximization. We address this issue theoretically and experimentally in the context of the Ultimatum Minigame, assuming that the choice of accepting or rejecting a greedy proposal is affected by a combination of frustration, due to unfulfilled expectations, and inequity aversion. We increase the responder's payoff from the default allocation (the pr...
