Compromise and coordination: An experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: He, Simin; Wu, Jiabin
• 署名单位: Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Oregon
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.003
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 216-233
• 关键词: Compromise; Battle-of-the-sexes; repeated games; Behavioral game theory; Experimental economics

摘要

This study experimentally examines the role of a compromise option in a repeated battleof-the-sexes game. In a random matching environment, we find that compromise serves as an effective focal point and facilitates coordination, but fails to improve efficiency. However, in a fixed-partnership environment, compromise deters subjects from learning to play alternation, which is a more efficient, but arguably more complex strategy. As a result, compromise hurts efficiency by allowing subjects to coordinate on the less efficient outcome. In a follow-up experiment, we find that many compromisers switch to alternation after playing the repeated game multiple times. These results suggest that subjects teach and learn to use the alternation strategy from each other. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.