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作者：Goel, Gagan; Mirrokni, Vahab; Leme, Renato Paes
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：Auctions for perishable goods such as Internet ad inventory need to make real-time allocation and pricing decisions as the supply of the good arrives in an online manner, without knowing the entire supply in advance. In this work, we consider a multi-unit model where buyers have global budget constraints, and the supply arrives in an online manner. Our main contribution is to show that for this setting there is an individuallyrational, incentive-compatible and Pareto-optimal auction that alloc...
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作者：Yang, Yi-You
作者单位：Aletheia University
摘要：We study choice functions which arise in the context of matching with contracts. A choice function is rationalizable if it coincides with a choice function induced by a preference relation over sets of contracts. We show that a choice function is rationalizable if and only if it satisfies the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP), and give an algorithm for verifying the rationalizability of a given choice function. Consequently, we prove that every path independent choice function is rati...
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作者：Catonini, Emiliano
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：Strong-Delta-Rationalizability introduces first-order belief restrictions in the analysis of forward induction reasoning. Without actual restrictions, it coincides with Strong Rationalizability (Battigalli, 2003; Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003). These solution concepts are based on the notion of strong belief (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002). The non-monotonicity of strong belief implies that the predictions of Strong-Delta-Rationalizability can be inconsistent with Strong Rationalizabilit...
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作者：Dur, Umut Mert; Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：North Carolina State University
摘要：No strategy-proof mechanism Pareto dominates the student-proposing Deferred Acceptance mechanism (hereafter DA). However, it is unknown if a mechanism can Pareto dominate DA in equilibrium. We demonstrate a surprising result: a market designer can do better by learning less about students' preferences when making a school assignment. Specifically, we demonstrate that running DA but limiting students to only two applications always has an equilibrium (in weakly undominated, pure strategies) tha...
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作者：Hill, Brian
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：The famous conflict between dynamic consistency and ambiguity purportedly undermines these models' normative credibility, and challenges their use in economic applications. Dynamic consistency concerns preferences over contingent plans: so what counts are the contingencies the decision maker envisages - and plans for - rather than independently fixed contingencies, as implicitly assumed in standard formalisations. An appropriate formulation of dynamic consistency resolves the aforementioned co...
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作者：Grech, Philip D.; Nax, Heinrich H.
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; University of Zurich
摘要：Experimental implementations of dictator games are found to differ in terms of their underlying strategic incentives. We explore this discovery in two separate directions. Theoretically, assuming identical other-regarding preferences, we show that the two most widely used protocols can generate strongly contrasting rational-choice predictions, from which different interpretations of dictator giving arise. Experimentally, a tailor-made experiment reveals significant differences between the two ...
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作者：Zhang, Jun
作者单位：Nanjing Audit University
摘要：In the house allocation model, the literature (Bade, 2016; Zhang, 2019) have proven impossibility theorems regarding the compatibility of efficiency, fairness, and group non-manipulability if agents' preferences are unrestricted. Since in many applications not all preferences are possible, this paper examines to what extent these theorems still hold on restricted preference domains. We find that these theorems still hold unless the domains are restricted to have a special tier structure. We pr...
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作者：Kennes, John; le Maire, Daniel; Roelsgaard, Sebastian T.
作者单位：Aarhus University; University of Copenhagen; Princeton University; Aarhus University
摘要：This paper offers expected revenue and pricing equivalence results for canonical matching models. The equivalence of these models is centered on the assumption that there are large numbers of buyers and sellers, and the contact decisions of buyers to sellers are made independently. Therefore, the distribution of buyers to sellers is approximated by the Poisson distribution. The list of canonical matching models includes the models developed by Burdett and Judd (1983), Shimer (2005), and McAfee...
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作者：Hwang, Sung-Ha; Rey-Bellet, Luc
作者单位：Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：We introduce new classes of games, called zero-sum equivalent games and zero-sum equivalent potential games, and prove decomposition theorems involving these classes of games. Two games are strategically equivalent if, for every player, the payoff differences between two strategies (holding other players' strategies fixed) are identical. A zero-sum equivalent game is a game that is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game; a zero-sum equivalent potential game is a potential game that is str...
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作者：Mookherjee, Dilip; Motta, Alberto; Tsumagari, Masatoshi
作者单位：Boston University; University of New South Wales Sydney; Keio University
摘要：In designing a contract with an agent privately informed about its cost, should a principal consult an expert who has already received a partially informative signal of the agent's cost? The expert has a prior relationship with the agent, facilitating (weak) ex ante collusion which coordinates their participation and reporting decisions with accompanying side-payments. While delegating contracting with the agent to the expert is never profitable, we show that consulting the expert is typically...
