Assortative multisided assignment games: The extreme core points

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Javier Martinez-de-Albeniz, F.; Rafels, Carlos; Ybern, Neus
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona; Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.001
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 144-153
• 关键词: Assortative market; assignment game; Multisided assignment game; core; Extreme core allocations

摘要

We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martinez-de-Albeniz et al. (2019). In them players' abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.