Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bloch, Francis; van den Nouweland, Anne
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; University of Oregon
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.001
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 32-54
• 关键词: Farsighted stable sets; Heterogeneous expectations; One-to-one matching; voting; Effectivity functions

摘要

This paper analyzes farsighted stability when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying the two properties of justifiability and maximality and define stable alternatives as unique stationary points of the expectation function of some agent. We characterize stable alternatives in one-to-one matching models and voting models, and show that the relaxation of the hypothesis of common expectations greatly expands the set of states that can be supported as farsightedly stable. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.