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作者：Ambuehl, Sandro; Groves, Vivienne
作者单位：University of Zurich; Stanford University
摘要：Unraveling, the excessively early matching of future workers to employers, leads to hiring decisions based on severely incomplete information. We provide a model of unraveling in a one-to-one matching market without transfers. Its distinguishing feature is the gradual arrival of information about students that occurs over an extended period of time during which matches can be made. In equilibrium, the market spreads thinly over that period and employers' attractiveness to students is uncorrela...
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作者：Newton, Jonathan; Sercombe, Damian
作者单位：Kyoto University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We consider two fundamental forces that can drive the diffusion of an innovation on a network. The first of these forces is potential maximization, a method of aggregating payoff incentives of players under individual agency. Potential maximization is related to the graph theoretic property of close-knittedness (Young, 2011). The second force is collective agency, under which sets of players decide together on whether to adjust their strategies. Collective agency is shown to be related to the ...
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作者：Swenson, Brian; Murray, Ryan; Kar, Soummya
作者单位：Princeton University; North Carolina State University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：A fundamental problem with the Nash equilibrium concept is the existence of certain structurally deficient equilibria that (i) lack fundamental robustness properties, and (ii) are difficult to analyze. The notion of a regular Nash equilibrium was introduced by Harsanyi. Such equilibria are isolated, highly robust, and relatively simple to analyze. A game is said to be regular if all equilibria in the game are regular. In this paper it is shown that almost all potential games are regular. That ...
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作者：Devanur, Nikhil R.; Haghpanah, Nima; Psomas, Alexandros
作者单位：Amazon.com; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：A seller can produce multiple units of a single good. The buyer has constant marginal value for each unit she receives up to a demand, and zero marginal value for units beyond the demand. The marginal value and the demand are drawn from a distribution and are privately known to the buyer. We show that under natural regularity conditions on the distribution, the optimal (revenue-maximizing) selling mechanism is deterministic. It is a price schedule that specifies the payment based on the number...
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作者：Correia-da-Silva, Joao
作者单位：Universidade do Porto; Universidade do Porto
摘要：In mechanism design problems where the outside option is a game, a version of the intuitive criterion restricts beliefs formed off-path in case of disagreement, and thus credible punishments for rejecting to participate. However, for virtual implementation, participation constraints can be relaxed by designing beliefs following disagreement using self-rejections: with a small probability that depends on the reported type profile, a mediator rejects the agreement in a way that is indistinguisha...
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作者：Alva, Samson; Manjunath, Vikram
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio; University of Ottawa
摘要：For a model of fractional matching, interpreted as probabilistic matching, together with the allocation of non-negative amounts of money, we show that strategy-proofness, ex post Pareto efficiency of the matching, and a weak version of ex ante individual rationality are incompatible when each agent's utility is a linear function of both their fractional assignment and money. We identify some avenues to escape this impossibility. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Balafoutas, Loukas; Garcia-Gallego, Aurora; Georgantzis, Nikolaos; Jaber-Lopez, Tarek; Mitrokostas, Evangelos
作者单位：University of Innsbruck; Universitat Jaume I; Universitat Jaume I; Universite Bourgogne Europe; Burgundy School of Business; University of Portsmouth; Hellenic Open University
摘要：Despite the economic and social significance of crime reduction and criminals' rehabilitation, research evaluating the effects of incarceration on behavior is surprisingly scarce. We conduct an experiment with 105 prison inmates and complement it with administrative data in order to explore several aspects of their social behavior. We first perform a comprehensive analysis of behavior in three economic games, finding evidence of discrimination against a sample from outside prison. In addition,...
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作者：Hu, Gaoji; Li, Jiangtao; Tang, Rui
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Singapore Management University; Princeton University
摘要：We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings in two-sided matching markets with one-sided preferences. Our main result connects the revealed preference analysis to the well-known lattice structure of the set of stable matchings, and tests the rationalizability of a data set by analyzing the joins and meets of matchings. (c) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Mitzkewitz, Michael; Neugebauer, Tibor
作者单位：University of Luxembourg; University of Luxembourg
摘要：We model economic transactions as prisoner's dilemma games with an outside option played by randomly matched pairs drawn from an anonymous population. In this environment, two intermediary institutions are studied who punish their customers for cheating. One institution does so by enforcing payment of a fine, while the other inflicts a bad reputation on the customer. By voluntarily becoming a customer of an intermediary institution, a player can signal her pre-commitment to honest action to th...
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作者：DeAngelo, Gregory; Gee, Laura K.
作者单位：Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; Tufts University
摘要：Punishments are meant to deter bad acts, but we commonly only punish those we catch. At some point in time, a society chooses how to catch bad acts. We explore the effect of how we catch bad acts on public good provision. We contrast monitoring done by peers (e.g., a neighbor reporting illegal dumping) to that done by an organized group (e.g., the police patrolling for crime). We find that when either type of monitoring is exogenously imposed, both peer and group monitoring lead to similar lev...
