Backward induction in games without perfect recall

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hillas, John; Kvasov, Dmitriy
• 署名单位: University of Auckland; Waseda University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.011
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 207-218
• 关键词: Extensive form games; Perfect recall; Linear games; Sequential equilibrium; Quasi-perfect equilibrium; Subgame perfect equilibrium; perfect equilibrium

摘要

The equilibrium concepts that we now think of as various forms of backwards induction, namely, subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965), perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975), sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), and quasi-perfect equilibrium (van Damme, 1984), while formally well defined in a wider class of games, are explicitly restricted to games with perfect recall. We argue that in games without perfect recall the original definitions are inappropriate. Our reading of the original papers is that the authors were aware that their definitions did not formally require the assumption of perfect recall but they were also aware that without the assumption of perfect recall the definitions they gave were not the correct ones. We give definitions of these concepts that identify the same outcomes in games with perfect recall and behave well in linear games without perfect recall. (c) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.