Bayesian games with intentions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bjorndahl, Adam; Halpern, Joseph Y.; Pass, Rafael
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.003
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 54-67
• 关键词: Bayesian game; Types; Intention; equilibrium; Psychological games; reference points

摘要

We define Bayesian games with intentions by introducing a distinction between intended and actual actions, generalizing both Bayesian games and (static) psychological games Geanakoplos et al. (1989). We propose a new solution concept for this framework and prove that Nash equilibria in static psychological games correspond to a special class of equilibria as defined in our setting. We also show how the actual/intended divide can be used to implement the distinction between real outcomes and reference outcomes so crucial to prospect theory, and how some of the core insights of prospect theory can thereby be captured using Bayesian games with intentions. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.