Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barbieri, Stefano; Serena, Marco
• 署名单位: Tulane University; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.07.005
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1-30
• 关键词: Dynamic contests; BIAS; Momentum effect

摘要

We consider a best-of-three Tullock contest between two ex-ante symmetric players. An effort-maximizing designer commits to a vector of three biases (advantages or disadvantages), one per match. When the designer can choose victory -dependent biases (i.e., biases that depend on the record of matches won by players), the effort-maximizing biases eliminate the momentum effect, leaving players equally likely to win each match and the overall contest. Instead, when the designer can only choose victory -independent biases, the effort-maximizing biases alternate advantages in the first two matches and leave players not equally likely to win the overall contest. Therefore, in an optimal victory -independent contest, ex-ante symmetric players need not be treated identically, though a coin flip may restore ex-ante symmetry. We analyze several extensions of our basic model, including generalized Tullock contests, ex-ante asymmetric players, best-of-five contests, and winner's effort maximization.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.