Optimal attention management: A tractable framework

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lipnowski, Elliot; Mathevet, Laurent; Wei, Dong
• 署名单位: Columbia University; European University Institute; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.029
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 170-180
• 关键词: Information disclosure; rational inattention; Costly information processing; Paternalistic information design

摘要

A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the principal makes available, the agent may choose to ignore some. We study optimal information provision in a tractable model with quadratic payoffs where full disclosure is not optimal. We characterize incentive-compatible information policies, that is, those to which the agent willingly pays full attention. In a leading example with three states, optimal disclosure involves information distortion at intermediate costs of attention. As the cost increases, optimal information changes from downplaying the state to exaggerating the state. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.