Issue selection, media competition, and polarization of salience

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yamaguchi, Yohei
• 署名单位: Waseda University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.004
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 197-225
• 关键词: electoral competition; Political campaign; Priming; media bias

摘要

In a political competition, political parties run their campaign communications to attract voters' attention to issues in which the parties have an advantage. Investigating how parties' issue selection strategy affects issue salience is crucial, considering the media outlets' behavior, as most voters receive political communication from parties through media reporting. In this study, I develop an issue selection model that incorporates the profit-maximization behavior of media outlets. First, I find that the issue coverage of media outlets diverges even when they do not have ideological preferences. Second, competition among media outlets and the strategic issue selection of parties lead to polarization in voters' issue salience weights. Finally, I show that this polarization increases the vote share of the party with lower-quality policy proposals. The results could be essential to understanding the relationship between issue salience, media, and their effect on electoral competition.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.