Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Harless, Patrick; Phan, William
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; North Carolina State University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.009
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 73-89
• 关键词: Object allocation; Priority rules; Convex combinations; EFFICIENCY; Guarantee

摘要

Equity motivates randomization, but often comes at the cost of efficiency. We study the tradeoff within the strategy-proof family of priority rules. Although randomization over all priority orders is incompatible with efficiency, we characterize the maximal subsets of priority for which randomization preserves efficiency: free-agent and adjacent-three families. Introducing equity measures for asymmetric rules, we show that mixtures within these subfamilies admit probabilistic guarantees that priority rules cannot deliver. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.