A dynamic theory of spatial externalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boucekkine, Raouf; Fabbri, Giorgio; Federico, Salvatore; Gozzi, Fausto
• 署名单位: Universite de Rennes; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); INRAE; Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; University of Genoa; Luiss Guido Carli University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.002
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 133-165
• 关键词: spatial externalities; Spatial diffusion; Differential games in continuous time and space; Infinite dimensional optimal control problems; Environmental federalism

摘要

We characterize the shape of spatial externalities in a continuous time and space differential game with transboundary pollution. We posit a realistic spatiotemporal law of motion for pollution (diffusion and advection), and tackle spatiotemporal non-cooperative (and cooperative) differential games. Precisely, we consider a circle partitioned into several states where a local authority decides autonomously about its investment, production and depollution strategies over time knowing that investment/production generates pollution, and pollution is transboundary. The time horizon is infinite. We allow for a rich set of geographic heterogeneities across states. We solve analytically the induced non-cooperative differential game and characterize its long-term spatial distributions. In particular, we prove that there exist a Perfect Markov Equilibrium, unique among the class of the affine feedbacks. We further provide with a full exploration of the free riding problem and the associated border effect. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.