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作者：Bandyopadhyay, T; Sengupta, K
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
摘要：This paper examines the connection between path independence and transitive rationalization of a choice function in a general domain where a choice function may nor include all possible non-empty subsets of the universal set. Describing a sequential choice procedure, this paper show's that the requirement of path independence of a choice function is equivalent to Richter's Congruence Axiom and thus to its transitive rationalization. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D11. (C...
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作者：Wallner, K
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：This paper analyzes a finite horizon, sequential move pricing duopoly, restricting attention to Markov strategies. The solution yields stationary patterns, independent of initial conditions, where the reaction-functions follow cycles of three periods. The market price never settles down, and is at all times strictly above marginal cost. Long-run average industry profits are approximately 5/6 of the monopoly level. These results demonstrate that neither a long horizon nor non-Markovian strategi...
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作者：Hillier, B; Rougier, J
作者单位：University of Liverpool; Durham University
摘要：This paper develops a simple neo-classical model of the business cycle characterised by multiple equilibria produced by the interaction of the investment and production processes. For the usual symmetric information model the source of the multiple equilibria may be found in non-linearities in the production function. Under asymmetric information another possible source of multiple equilibria is non-linearities in the investment-wealth relationship. Persistence is generated by changes in the s...
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作者：Makowski, L; Ostroy, JM; Segal, U
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：Efficient, anonymous, and continuous mechanisms for exchange environments with a finite number of individuals are dominant strategy incentive compatible if and only if they are perfectly competitive, i.e., each individual is unable to influence prices or anyone's wealth. Equivalently, in such a mechanism each individual creates no externalities for others by her announcement of a type. The characterization applies whether preferences are ordinal or quasilinear, and it also applies to continuum...
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作者：Martimort, D
作者单位：Universite de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour; Universite de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour
摘要：One striking feature of the internal organization of governments is the existence of multiple regulators. This paper explains this organizational choice as coming from the government's limited ability to commit. The separation of powers between two regulators is modeled as a Stackelberg common agency game. With respect to the case of a single regulator, the allocative efficiency and the regulated firm's informational rent are both reduced in the unique equilibrium of this game. However, when r...
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作者：Gretsky, NE; Ostroy, JM; Zame, WR
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper provides a rigorous formalization, in the context of the transferable utility assignment model, of perfect competition as the inability of individuals to (favorably) influence prices. The central tool for the analysis is the social gains function; the central issue is differentiability of the gains function with respect to the population. Seven conditions are shown to be equivalent to perfect competition. Perfect competition and imperfect competition are possible for both finite and...
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作者：Bandyopadhyay, T; Dasgupta, I; Pattanaik, PK
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; Deakin University
摘要：This paper extends the deterministic revealed preference theory of consumers' behavior to permit stochastic choices. In this extended framework, we introduce a restriction on stochastic choices that constitutes a stochastic counterpart of the weak axiom of revealed preference. This restriction allows us to derive stochastic versions of nonpositivity of the own substitution effect and the demand theorem. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Number Number: D11. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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作者：Spagnolo, G
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; University of Cambridge
摘要：Following Bernheim and Whinston (1990), this paper addresses the effects of multimarket contact on firms' ability to collude. Real world imperfections tend to make firms' objective function strictly concave and market supergames interdependent: firms' payoffs in each market depend on how they are doing in others. Then, multimarket contact always facilitates collusion. It may even make collusion sustainable in all markets when otherwise it would not be sustainable in any. The effects of conglom...
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作者：Francois, P; Shi, SY
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Tilburg University
摘要：This paper establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of stationary cycles in an economy comprising independent investing firms. The economy is not subject to aggregate uncertainty, investors have no direct complementarities, and all agents act independently. The cycle arises due to general equilibrium contemporanrous complementarities between investors devoting resources to innovation which yields temporary profits. With numerical examples we show that there art: multip...
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作者：Strausz, R
作者单位：Free University of Berlin
摘要：We consider sequential partnerships in which agents obtain non-verifiable information about the actions taken by previous agents. For such partnerships a budget-balanced sharing rule exists that induces efficient production. The sharing rule has many desirable features: (1) it uniquely implements efficient production, (2) it does not rely on message games, (3) it does not rely on unlimited liability, and (4) it is robust to renegotiation. The rule is furthermore simple; intuitive; and robust t...
