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作者：Gul, F; Stacchetti, E
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We study economies with indivisibilities that satisfy the gross substitutes (GS) condition. The simplest example of GS preferences are unit demand preferences. We prove that the set of GS preferences is the largest set containing unit demand preferences for which the existence of Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed. We show that if a GS economy is replicated sufficiently many times, the equilibrium payment of any agent in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is equal to the value of the allocat...
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作者：Hofbauer, J; Sorger, G
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Vienna
摘要：The equilibrium selection approach of Matsui and Matsuyama (J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995), 415-434) which is based on rational players who maximize their discounted future payoff, is analyzed for symmetric two-player games with a potential function. It is shown that the maximizer of the potential function is the unique state that is absorbing and globally accessible for small discount rates. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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作者：Saijo, T; Yamato, T
作者单位：University of Osaka; Japan Science & Technology Agency (JST); Tokyo Metropolitan University
摘要：In the previous mechanism design on public goods, it was implicitly assumed that every agent must participate in the mechanism that the designer provides. This approach neglects non-excludability of public goods. We explicitly incorporate non-excludability and examine a two-stage game with voluntary participation: In the first stage, each agent simultaneously decides whether she participates ill the mechanism or not, and in the second stage, knowing the other agents' participation decisions, t...
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作者：Battigalli, P; Siniscalchi, M
作者单位：Princeton University; European University Institute
摘要：The epistemic analysis of solution concepts for dynamic games involves statements about the players' beliefs conditional upon different histories of play, their conditional beliefs about each other's conditional beliefs, etc. To represent such statements, we construct a space of infinite (coherent) hierarchies of conditional probability systems, defined with respect to ii fixed collection of. relevant hypotheses concerning an external state (e.g., the strategy profile being played.) As an appl...
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作者：Jackson, MO; Kalai, E
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Northwestern University
摘要：A folk theorem of game theory illustrates that strategic use of reputation can drastically alter the equilibrium play of an isolated group of n-players engaged in a finitely repeated game. We show that this folk theorem may fail in social settings where many groups of n-players play the game sequentially. The ability to strategically use reputation dies out over time due to players' opportunity to observe the play of earlier groups. This phenomenon is demonstrated in a model of Bayesian recurr...
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作者：Sáez-Martí, M; Weibull, JW
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
摘要：In the models of Young (1993, Econometrica 61, 57-84; 1993, J. Econ. Theory 59, 145-168), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent: history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do. We investigate this possibility in the context of Young's (J. Econ. Theory 59, 145-168) bargaining model. It t...
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作者：Sönmez, T
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Koc University
摘要：We study manipulation via pre-arranged matches in the context of centralized two-sided matching markets. We show that the solution that is used to match the hospitals and medical residents in the United States, namely the hospital-optimal stable rule, is manipulable in this way. Unfortunately this is a general problem: We show that there is no solution that is both stable and non-manipulable. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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作者：Vohra, R
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：We consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time of engaging in state contingent contracts. While communication of private information is permitted, the true information state is not verifiable. The enforcement of contracts is, therefore, limited by incentive compatibility constraints. We formalize a notion of the core for such an economy. Our analysis can be viewed as an attempt to incorporate incentive compatibility in the coarse core of R. Wilson (1978...
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作者：Dana, RA; Le Van, C; Magnien, F
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：In this paper we first prove an equilibrium existence theorem for finite dimensional economies with unbounded below consumption sets. We only assume that the individually rational utility set is compact and use the demand approach instead of the standard Negishi's approach. We next compare the different concepts of no-arbitrage that have been used in the literature and give conditions ibr equivalence between absence of arbitrage and existence of equilibrium Lastly, we introduce the concept of ...
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作者：Katzman, B
作者单位：University of Miami
摘要：Working within the independent private values paradigm, I examine a sequence of two second price auctions where individual bidders have diminishing marginal valuations. Equilibria are characterized for complete and incomplete informational settings. When information is complete, allocations can be inefficient and price sequences are constant or decreasing. However, when information is incomplete and symmetric, equilibrium behavior produces efficient outcomes and an expectation of increasing pr...
