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作者：Boucekkine, R; del Río, F; Licandro, O
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：In this paper, we present a particular case of the creative destruction model of Caballero and Hammour, (Quart. J. Econ. 111 (1996), 805-851) in which both exogenous and endogenous fluctuation sources are present. We show that job creation Follows a delayed differential equation with periodic coefficients. The delay is equal to the optimal age of capital goods. The period of the coefficients is equal to the period of an exogenous profitability cycle. We mathematically show that job creation is...
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作者：Saari, DG
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A theory is developed to explain all possible three-alternative (single-profile) pairwise and positional voting outcomes. This includes all preference aggregation paradoxes, cycles, conflict between the Borda and Condorcet winners, differences among positional outcomes (e.g., the plurality and antiplurality methods), and differences among procedures using these outcomes (e.g., runoffs, Kemeny's rule, and Copeland's method). It is shown how to identify, interpret, and construct all profiles sup...
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作者：Mandler, M
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Pareto improvements that require no information about individual characteristics are analyzed. Initially, equilibrium must be production inefficient. After the policy change, consumer prices differ From producer prices, but allocations, although second-best, are Pareto superior and production efficient. Policy implementation is modeled as a dynamical system that governs aggregate consumer wealth, producer prices, and production levels. With knowledge of the maximum feasible level of consumer w...
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作者：Roberts, K
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Conditions that exhaust the implications of rationality (homogeneity, symmetry, definiteness) are well known, but these apply under a single set of constraints. If a situation can be compared with another situation where extra constraints are imposed, there are stronger implications. One example is the (local) LeChatelier principle. However, a global LeChatelier principle does not always hold, and this paper shows that it cannot always hold in any nondegenerate problem. Despite this, a global ...
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作者：Thiele, H; Wambach, A
作者单位：University of Munich; University of Munich
摘要：This paper addresses the question of how the principal's surplus and agency costs depend on the agent's wealth. Our main results are that if the agent has an additively separable utility function in income and effort and his degree of absolute prudence is smaller than three times the agent's degree of absolute risk aversion, then the principal's expected pay-off is smaller the richer the agent. For general utility functions, this result also holds if the first order approach is applicable and ...
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作者：Gatti, JRJ
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper analyses the optimal search strategy for consumers who wish to purchase several different commodities, possibly from several different firms, but are not perfectly informed about the prices charged by each firm for every commodity. It is shown that in general the optimal search strategy will nor possess the Reservation Property, the multi-commodity equivalent of a Reservation Price. Necessary and sufficient conditions are identified for the optimal search strategy to possess the Res...
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作者：Caputo, MR
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：The formal relationship between Silberberg's (J. Econ. Theory 7 (1974), 159-172) primal-dual method of comparative statics and Hatta's (Rev. Econ. Stud. 17 (1980), 957-997) gain method of comparative statics is established. It is proven that the primal-dual method generates all the comparative statics results derivable by the gain method, but not the converse. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C60, C61. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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作者：Moulin, H
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：A commodity is divided among agents with single-peaked preferences. The commodity is either infinitely divisible or comes in indivisible units. A rationing method elicits individual peaks (demands); if the commodity is overdemanded (resp. underdemanded), no agent receives more (resp. less) than his peak. A fixed-path rationing method allocates an overdemanded good along a path independent of individual demands, except that an agent receives exactly his demand if it is below the path-generated ...
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作者：Jehiel, P; Moldovanu, B; Stacchetti, E
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Mannheim; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：In an auction with externalities, a buyer's type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the Nf I possible outcomes: the seller keeps the object or buyer i (i = I,..., N) gets the object. We provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that For one-dimensional mechanisms. Although reservation utilities are endogenous and type-dependent, the participation constraint is binding for only one critical type. A main difficult...
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作者：Epstein, LG; Peters, M
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Rochester
摘要：In modelling competition among mechanism designers, it is necessary to specify the set of feasible mechanisms. These specifications are often borrowed from the optimal mechanism design literature and exclude mechanisms that are natural in a competitive environment, for example, mechanisms that depend on the mechanisms chosen by competitors. This paper constructs a set of mechanisms that is universal in that any specific model of the feasible set can be embedded in it. An equilibrium for a spec...
