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作者：Marjit, S; Beladi, H
作者单位：University System of Ohio; University of Dayton
摘要：Growth in the import-competing output is usually accompanied by a decline in the volume of imports of the product. This result may change when we consider intermediate goods. We develop a multi-sector general equilibrium model to show that larger local output of an intermediate good may also imply larger imports of the same. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: F1, F11, F13. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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作者：Chung, KS
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This note first uses a simple example to show that H. Matsushima's (1991, J. Econ. Theory 54, 198-203) regularity condition, to the contrary of his claim, actually does not imply C. d'Aspremont and L.-A. Gerard-Varet's (1979, J. Public Ei on. 11, 25-45) compatibility condition. It then proves a stronger version of Matsushima's proposition, namely that efficient public decision rules can be truthfully implemented with budget-balancing mechanisms under the, weak regularity condition. (C) 1999 Ac...
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作者：Cadenillas, A; Zapatero, F
作者单位：University of Alberta; University of Southern California
摘要：We consider a currency with exchange rate dynamics modeled as a geometric Brownian motion. The objective of the Central Bank is to keep this exchange rate as close as possible to a given target, so there is a running cost associated to the difference between the exchange rate and the target. Additionally, there are also fixed and proportional costs associated with each intervention. The objective of this paper is to iind the optimal level of intervention, and the optimal sizes of the intervent...
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作者：Chwe, MSY
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：I present in Simple two-person auction model in which a seller and a buyer make bids in terms of money; however: the value of a unit of money is uncertain. I show: (1) a monetary revaluation has purely nominal effects if and only if it is common knowledge: (2) if seller and buyer have identical beliefs, making the value of money common knowledge maximizes total gains from trade; (3) if seller and buyer are equally well informed and have identical beliefs, then monetary revaluations have no net...
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作者：Schroder, M; Skiadas, C
作者单位：Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business; Northwestern University
摘要：We develop the utility gradient (or martingale) approach for computing portfolio and consumption plans that maximize stochastic differential utility (SDU), a continuous-time version of recursive utility due to D. Duffie and L. Epstein (1992, Econometrica 60. 353-394). We characterize the first-order conditions of optimality as a system of forward-backward SDEs, which, in the Markovian case, reduces to a system of PDEs and forward only SDEs that is amenable to numerical computation, Another con...
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作者：Brusco, S
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：In situations of complete information, when a social choice function can be implemented using an extensive form game. it is always the case that there is an equilibrium which does not go beyond the first stage (that is, an equilibrium with one round of signaling). We show that this is not true in the incomplete information case. We provide: an example in which a social choice function cannot be implemented with an extensive form game if the mechanism has an equilibrium with one round of signal...
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作者：Bag, PK; Winter, E
作者单位：University of London; Birkbeck University London; Washington University (WUSTL); Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：For excludable public goods, we propose simple mechanisms to implement a (core) stable and efficient production and cost-sharing outcome: consumers are asked to announce sequentially their minimal requested level of public good and a subscription towards its production. In one mechanism the subscriptions depend on the order of moves. In a second mechanism, the subscriptions are order-independent and thus symmetric. The equilibrium outcomes induced by our mechanisms are immune to strategic devi...
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作者：Arrow, KJ; Hahn, F
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Siena
摘要：A sequence economy is an economy with trade at every date and state. It is inessential if its equilibria coincide with those of the corresponding Arrow-Debreu economy. We examine some of the conditions for essentiality. (1) If there are transaction costs, then even if all states of nature are spanned by the securities, the economy is generically essential. (2) In the absence of transaction costs, we show by examples that spanning is neither necessary nor sufficient for inessentiality, the form...
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作者：Cozzi, G
作者单位：Cornell University; Sapienza University Rome
摘要：If R&D produces nonrival inputs then firms have an incentive to cooperate, but free riding can make cooperation difficult. This paper builds a simple endogenous growth model allowing cooperative behavior among firms in their R&D game. growth Industry's first best cooperative investment is enforceable as an equilibrium only if technology is above a threshold level. This model allows for switching equilibria able to sustain slower growth in poorer countries. The model also admits sunspot equilib...
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作者：Gale, D; Rosenthal, RW
作者单位：New York University; Boston University
摘要：Do boundedly rational agents repeatedly playing a symmetric game with a unique symmetric equilibrium learn over time to play it? In this paper we model the dynamic interaction of two types of such agents, experimenters and imitators, whose behavior is characterized by simple rules of thumb. We iind that the stochastic process describing their play is stable in the large: it converges globally and with probability one to st compact neighborhood of the equilibrium. However, its local behavior ne...
