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作者：Blackorby, C; Bossert, W; Donaldson, D
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Aix-Marseille Universite; University of Nottingham; University of British Columbia
摘要：This note investigates the extension of Roberts' price-independent welfare prescriptions to alternatives in which population size and composition can vary. We show that ethically unsatisfactory orderings result. Suppose that a single person is to be added to a population that is unaffected in utility terms. Either all such additions must be regarded as bad or some expansions in which the added person's life is not worth living must be ranked as social improvements. Journal of Economic Literatu...
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作者：Chen, MA; Maskin, ES
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：The automatic bargaining theory of J. Nash (1950. Econometrica 18. 155-162) presumes that only status quo utilities and the shape of the utility possibilities set are relevant to the bargaining outcome. Here we consider a class of economic problems for which bargaining solutions may depend on more than just utility information. (A fifty-fifty split of a single good between two bargainers is one example of such a solution.) It is shown that the requirements of Pareto efficiency), weak symmetry,...
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作者：Schönhofer, M
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：Chaotic temporary equilibrium trajectories under least squares learning are shown to exist in a standard version of the overlapping generations model. Theses trajectories show forecast errors that never vanish. Thus we do not find convergence to an equilibrium, in which agents have perfect foresight. Complex trajectories can even be found in the case of savings functions, which are monotonically decreasing in the expected gross rate of inflation. In this case no cyclical or chaotic trajectorie...
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作者：Deb, R; Razzolini, L
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; University of Mississippi
摘要：We study the problem of strategy-proof mechanism design for indivisible and excludable public goods. Applying Vickrey's theory of auctions we associate a class of strategy-proof mechanisms to two types of procedures, the English Auction-Like Mechanism (EALM) and the Sealed Bid Auction-Like Mechanism (SBALM). We show that these two Auction-Like Mechanisms lead to identical outcomes. We justify the use of these mechanisms as compared to other strategy-proof mechanisms by arguing that outcomes of...
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作者：van Hees, M
作者单位：University of Groningen
摘要：Drawing on the game-theoretic analysis of rights, this paper re-examines the relation between liberal principles of decision making, on the one hand, and demands for stability and efficiency, on the other. Two possibility results are obtained. First, rights assignments in which individuals enjoy maximal freedom are shown to ensure the stability and efficiency of the decision process: there is always at least one Nash equilibrium with a Pareto-optimal outcome. Second, it is shown that a univers...
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作者：Brusco, S; Jackson, MO
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the optimal design of the rules of trade in a two-period market given that agents arrive at different times and may only trade with agents present contemporaneously. First period agents face a fixed cost of trading across periods. Given the non-convexities associated with the fixed cost, competitive trading rules can result in inefficiencies in such a market and anonymity must be sacrificed to achieve efficiency. Efficient trading rules have a market maker (who is given a monopoly rig...
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作者：Jordan, JS; Xu, DB
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Models of the behavior of the firm under uncertainty typically assume that the joint probability distribution over all random variables is common knowledge, and only the realized values of some variables are observed differentially. The main result of this paper shows that if the knowledge of the relevant probabilities is initially decentralized, then expected-profit maximizing decisions can require unbounded communication, as measured by the minimal message space dimension. The result is obta...
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作者：Bergin, J; Duggan, J
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：The goal of non-cooperative foundations is to provide credible non-cooperative models of negotiation and coalition formation whose equilibrium outcomes agree with a given cooperative solution. Here we argue that this goal is best achieved by explicitly modeling the physical environment and individual preferences, and by constructing game forms independent of preferences to implement the cooperative solution. We propose a general model of the physical environment; we characterize the coalitiona...
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作者：Barucci, E; Bischi, GI; Gardini, L
作者单位：University of Pisa; University of Urbino
摘要：We study forward-looking economic models assuming that agents take one step ahead expectations looking back k time periods. We show that the dynamics of the economy with such an expectation Function are characterized by the coexistence of perfect foresight and nonperfect foresight cycles. The stability of all these periodic solutions under bounded rationality is related to the stability of the perfect foresight cycles. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, D83, D84; E31, ...
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作者：Yilankaya, O
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：It is shown with an example that, in bilateral trade problems with two-sided incomplete information. some seller types may obtain higher expected payoffs in mechanisms other than the one where they make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, contrary to popular belief. It. one looks at the mechanism selection problem of the (informed) seller, then the optimality of a take-it-or-leave-it offer for the seller is restored. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D82. (C) 1999 Acade...
