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作者：Cabrales, A
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementation mechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics converge and are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium. In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of complexity commonly used against this mechanism. For a mechanism that implements using the iterated deletion of dominated strategies, the dynamics converge but are less stable. Journal of Economic Literature Classifi...
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作者：Duggan, J
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：A general theorem on extending binary relations to linear (or strict linear) orders is proved. The well-known result that every partial order can be written as the intersection of linear orders in which it is embedded is obtained as a special case, as are several other extension theorems of this type. Using duality arguments, a number of results on the composition of binary relations are proved. For example, a complete, negatively transitive relation is the union of all linear orders embedded ...
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作者：Askenazy, P; Le Van, C
摘要：In this paper we present an optimal growth model with convex-concave technology for an open developing country. The latter may choose to produce consumption goods by borrowing on capital markets or to import consumption goods by investing its saving on capital markets. We prove there exist two nontrivial steady states. An optimal path converges either to 0 or to the high steady state, that depends on the levels of the initial debt and/or of the debt constraint. We also prove there exists a pov...
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作者：Stamland, T
作者单位：University of Wyoming
摘要：This paper shows that a signaling game has separating equilibria if and only if a monotonicity condition holds. This condition requires that, once the sender's types have been ordered according to the single-crossing condition, higher types elicit higher valuations. When this condition fails there may be many D1 outcomes, and the D1 criterion no longer guarantees Pareto dominance. For signaling games that violate this monotonicity condition, we select an equilibrium that conveys as much inform...
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作者：Einy, E; Moreno, D; Shitovitz, B
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Haifa
摘要：We study the asymptotic nucleolus of differentiable monopolistic market games in continuum economies with a finite number of traders' types, and show that, under appropriate assumptions, it is the center of symmetry of the subset of the core in which all the monopolists receive the same payoff: Thus, the nucleolus discriminates the traders in the atomless sector, whereas the competitive equilibrium does not. Moreover, if there is a single syndicated atom and a finite number of atomless sectors...
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作者：Abdulkadiroglu, A; Sönmez, T
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Koc University
摘要：In many real-life applications of house allocation problems, whenever an existing tenant wants to move, he needs to give up his current house before getting another one. This practice discourages existing tenants from such attempts and results in loss of potentially large gains from trade. Motivated by this observation, we propose a simple mechanism that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof. Our approach is constructive and we provide two algorithms, each of which can...
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作者：Yoon, K
摘要：Wt construct a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium in Green and Porter's (1984, Econometrica 52, 87-100) imperfect public information model, which Paretodominates the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D43, D82. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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作者：Alós-Ferrer, C
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：Many models postulate a continuum of agents of finitely many types who are repeatedly randomly matched in pairs to perform certain activities (e.g., play a game) which may in turn make their types change. If the random matching process is left unspecified, no law of large numbers holds in this framework, casting doubts on the deterministic approximations which are usually informally invoked. This work shows that there exist random matching processes for a continuum of agents satisfying propert...
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作者：Rabault, G
摘要：This paper proposes a framework for the decomposition of risk into an aggregate and an idiosyncratic component which sidesteps the difficulties inherent in continuums of random variables, addressed recently in Al Najjar (Econometrica 63 (1995), 1195-1224). It assumes that the population is denumerable and that individuals are indistinguishable ex ante. In that context, a factorization of risk exists. A a-field of aggregate events can be identified, which is such that all aggregate quantities a...
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作者：Esteban, J; Ray, D
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Boston University
摘要：We develop a behavioral model that links the level and pattern of social conflict to the societywide distribution of individual characteristics. The model can be applied to groups that differ in characteristics such as wealth, ethnicity, religion, and political ideology. We settle questions of existence and uniqueness of conflict equilibrium. Conflict is seen to be closely connected with the bimodality of the underlying distribution of characteristics. However, in general, the conflict-distrib...
