-
作者：Agastya, M
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
摘要：Players adaptively learn how to bargain. A characteristic function describes the available surplus. The underlying bargaining game extends the Nash demand game by allowing subcoalitions to reach an agreement. Players' demands must be multiples of a money unit. We show that stochastically stable allocations (SSA) (i.e., allocations that are most stable to unlikely errors) are a subset of the core. Uniqueness does not obtain even when the money unit becomes arbitrarily small. Nonetheless, every ...
-
作者：Friedman, E; Moulin, H
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Duke University
摘要：We study cost sharing methods with variable demands of heterogeneous goods, additive in the cost function and meeting the dummy axiom. We consider four axioms: scale invariance (SI); demand monotonicity (DM); upper bound for homogeneous goods (UBH) placing a natural cap on cost shares when goods are homogeneous; average cost pricing for homogeneous goods (ACPH). The random order values based on stand alone costs are characterized by SI and DM. Serial costsharing, by DM and UB; the Aumann-Shapl...
-
作者：Bisin, A; Gottardi, P
作者单位：New York University; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies where agents trade in markets for standardized, non-exclusive financial contracts, under conditions of asymmetric information (both of the moral hazard and the adverse selection type). The problems for the existence of competitive equilibria in this framework are identified, and shown to be essentially the same under different forms of asymmetric information. We then show that a minimal form of non-linearity of prices (a bid-ask spread, re...
-
作者：Konishi, H; Le Breton, M; Weber, S
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：In this paper we consider two notions of a coalitional deviation: strict deviation, where each of member of a deviating group is better off, and weak deviation, where at least one member of a deviating group is better off while all other members are at least as well off. We then examine, for the class of common agency games introduced in Bernheim and Whinston (Quart. J. Econ. 101 (1986), 1-31), the structure and properties of two notions of a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, generated by stri...
-
作者：Dekel, E; Fudenberg, D; Levine, DK
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium in which players use information about opponents' payoffs in forming beliefs about the way that opponents play off of the equilibrium path. We show that this concept is robust to payoff uncertainty. We also discuss its relati...
-
作者：Kornish, LJ
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Y. Balcer and S. A. Lippman (1984, J. Econ. Theory 34, 292-318) develop a model to analyze the buy or wait problem under technological change. They show that this dynamic problem has a threshold solution: if the difference between the best available technology and that currently held exceeds a:certain threshold, then buy. They also claim that the threshold is increasing in the discovery potential. That is, the faster the technology is changing, the higher the threshold. In this note, we point ...
-
作者：Hüsseinov, F
作者单位：Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：This paper presents a market equilibrium existence theorem that generalizes and unifies many well-known results. The importance of the theorem is illustrated by applications to large exchange economics. A further extension of Aumann's Existence theorem is obtained which dispenses with the monotony assumption on preferences. In addition the market equilibrium results of Grandmont and Neuefeind are compared. It is shown that the boundary condition of Grandmont's result is equivalent to some natu...
-
作者：Dekel, E; Scotchmer, S
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk-takers and the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-lake-ail game determines the males' right to reproduce, and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to he risk-takers. Psychological and sociological evidence buttresses the argument that males are more risk-taking than females. Using an evolutionary model of preference-formation, we investigate to what extent ...
-
作者：Wälde, K
作者单位：Dortmund University of Technology; The World Bank
摘要：This paper studies optimal saving and investment behaviour of a household that can either invest in a riskless or a risky saving technology when risk results from a Poisson process. The focus is on behaviour of households in a general equilibrium setup. Poisson processes are introduced since they allow us to understand and model endogenous cycles jointly with long-run growth. It turns out that a very simple, intuitive and tractable characterization of equilibrium is possible. Journal of Econom...
-
作者：Chakravorti, B
摘要：This paper is motivated by Rubinstein (1980), who introduces a solution concept for voting games called the stability set which resolves the well-known paradox of voting. We argue here that this resolution is based on a model of farsightedness that has drawbacks: iii the voters are myopic in the sense that they ignore far-sightedness on the part of others and (ii) voters look only one step ahead and do not consider events arbitrarily hr ahead. To address these issues, we propose a model of con...
