Strategic buyers and privately observed prices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergemann, D; Välimäki, J
• 署名单位: Yale University; University of Southampton
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2891
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 469-482
• 关键词: Repeated games; private monitoring; collusion

摘要

A model of finitely repeated price competition between two sellers with differentiated goods and a large buyer is analyzed. The set of pure strategy sequential equilibria is investigated under public and private monitoring. With private monitoring, i.e., when prices are not observable to the competing sellers, all sales are made by the better seller and the set of repeated game equilibrium payoffs coincides with the stage game subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. This is in sharp contrast to the game with perfect monitoring where the folk theorem obtains. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).