On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Oechssler, J; Riedel, F
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; Humboldt University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2950
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 223-252
• 关键词: replicator dynamics; evolutionary stability; ESS; CSS

摘要

We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept, evolutionary robustness, which is stronger than the previous concepts. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in doubly symmetric games. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).