Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Serizawa, S
• 署名单位: Tohoku University; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2002.2940
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 219-241
• 关键词: pure exchange economies; strategy-proofness; Pareto-efficiency; individual rationality; symmetry

摘要

In his pioneering article, (in Decision and Organization (C. B. McGuire and R. Radner, Eds.), pp. 297-336, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1972) Hurwicz establishes that there is no strategy proof, Pareto-efficient, and individually rational rule for pure exchange economies with two agents and two goods, provided that the domain includes a sufficiently wide class of classical preferences. In this article, we extend his result to pure exchange economies with any finite number of agents and goods. We establish that (i) there is no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and individually rational rule on the class of classical, homothetic, and smooth preferences; and (ii) there is no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and symmetric rule on the same class of preferences. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D78, D71, C72. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).