Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bhaskar, V; Vega-Redondo, F
• 署名单位: University of Essex; Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2809
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 334-350
• 关键词: Repeated games; Markov equilibria; bounded rationality

摘要

We provide a theoretical foundation for the use of Markov strategies in repeated games with asynchronous moves. If admissible strategies must display Finite (arbitrarily long) memory and each player incurs a complexity cost which depends on the memory length required by her strategy, then every Nash equilibrium must be in Markovian strategies. If, in addition, admissible strategies have uniformly bounded memory, every rationalizable strategy must be Markovian. These results are robust to considerations of perfection and also yield interesting implications for equilibrium selection in simple contexts. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).